

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

#### BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)

Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2) Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)

Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2E) Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT

: NIE-87: Probable Developments within the

Satellites

- 1. The attached terms of reference were agreed upon by the IAC representatives on 26 February.
- 2. Contributions will be made on an ability to contribute basis.
  - 3. Contributions are due in this office on 1 April 1953.

PAUL A. BOREL
Executive Secretary

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 February 1953

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIB-87: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

#### THE PROBLEM

To estimate: (a) the present and probable future extent of Seviet control over the Satellites; and (b) probable developments within the Satellites.

#### QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

## I. SOVIET CONTROL OVER EACH SATELLITE

A. What is the extent of Soviet control over the Satellites and with what instruments and techniques is it exercised?

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As used in this paper, the term "European Satellites" includes East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

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To what extent does Seviet comfired depend upon Seviet police and military force? Upon Satellite police and military force?

- B. What changes have occured since 1950 in the methods by which Soviet control is maintained? What changes are likely to occur?
- C. How successful has the Kremlin been in winning popular support in the Satellites for its policies?
- Do How effective has the Kremlin been in coping with problems presented by the traditional hatred of Russia (except in Czecheslovakia and Bulgaria), ethnic and religious groups within the Satellites, nationalism, the Western cultural tradition, Soviet economic exploitation, the current decline of the standard of living?
- E. Is there any evidence that the Kremlin's ability to ensure the subservience and reliability of the Satellite Communist Parties and the Satellite governments will be shaken? What problems or issues might alter or further strain the relationship of the regime to the Soviet Union? Are any strains likely to develop?

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Fo Under what conditions or circumstances might the Kremlin incorporate any of the Satellites into the USSR? Is there any evidence that this will take place?

## II. THE STABILITY OF EACH SATELLITE

- A. Describe the character and effectiveness of the controls employed by the regime?
- B. Are there any intra-party tensions or conflicts? Do deviationist or nationalist splinter elements exist?
- Co. What are the relationships between the Party apparatus, the Secret Pelice, the armed forces, and the state apparatus?
- D. What is the significance of the various purges which have occurred within the past two years?
- E. What degree of popular support does the regime enjoy?

  Has this popular support increased or decreased since

  1950 among the peacents? The workers? The youth?

  Various segments of the middle class? The intellectuals?
- F. Which political parties or opposition groups are still allowed legal existence? What is the present strength of these groups? What is their significance?

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- G. How strong and effective are underground opposition groups? What connections do these groups have with emigre groups in the West?
- H. What problems or issues might strain or challenge the regime's stability?
- I. What degree of isolation from the West has been achieved? What degree of success have the BBC, VCA, and RFE had in reaching the people of the Satellites?
- J. Which Satellite regimes are least stable? What are the chief vulnerabilities of each Satellite to Western political warfare? Which Satellites are most vulnerable to Western political warfare?
- This section is designed to examine the 1952 position and the probable future development of the economy of each Satellite.

  Questions C through I should, therefore, be answered with reference both to the economy of each Satellite as of 1952

and to the foreseeable developments of that economy.

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- A. What is the long-term Soviet economic program for the Satellites individually and collectively?
- B. To what extent have production plans been met? What factors have accounted for any failures to meet present plans?
- C. What is the estimated gross national product of each Satellite?
- D. What proportion of gross national production is allocated to:
  - 1. Military purposes?
  - 2. Capital investment?
  - 3. Non-military consumption?
  - 4. Uncompensated deliveries to the USSR?
- E. How significant are the contributions of each Satellite's economy (including military production) to the USSR?
- Fo What is the capacity of the natural and human resources of each country for industrial development? What are the major limitations upon the development of the economy?

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- Go To what extent has agriculture been collectivized?

  How effective will resistance be to any future increase in the tempo of collectivization? Would other forces of opposition against the regime ally with this resistance to challenge the regime and Soviet control?
- H. What are the extent and the effect of the decline of the standard of living?
- I. Describe the pattern of the country's foreign trade.
  - l. What is the role of foreign trade in the nation"s economy?
  - 2. To what extent is the country's economy dependent upon intra-Satellite trade? Intra-Bloc trade?
  - 3. Which items must be obtained cutside the Bloc?
  - 4. How vulnerable is the country's economy to economic warfare?
- Jo How significant are the contributions of each Satellite to the scientific and technical capabilities of the USSR?

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## IV. THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF EACH SATELLITE

- A. What are the strength and probable future development of the armed forces, including the security forces, of each Satellite: size, composition, equipment, mobility, training, morale, reliability, combat efficiency, disposition, co-ordination, personnel replacement policy, and mobilization potential?
- Bo How effective is the control of each regime over its armed forces, including the security forces? What is the extent of Soviet control and how is it exercised? How might this control be shaken?
- Co What are the present and probable future degrees of coordination between the various Satellite forces and the Seviet
  forces?

## V. THE SATELLITES AS A UNIT

A. What is, and what is likely to be, the extent of the political, economic, and military integration of the Satellites with each other and with the USSR?

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B. How effective have the Kremlin and the Satellite regimes been, and how effective are they likely to be, in coping with territorial conflicts and other antagonisms which exist among the Satellites?

## VI. EFFECT OF PRINCIPAL POSSIBLE EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

- A. What effect would the growth of Western unity, resolution, and political, economic, and military strength have within each of the various Satellites? Upon Soviet control of each of the Satellites?
- B. What effect would the division of the West, the weakening of Western resolution, and the decline of the political, economic, and military strength of the West have within each of the Satellites? Upon Soviet control of each of the various Satellites?
- Co. What would be the effect upon each of the various Satellites and upon Soviet control of each of the Satellites of acceptance by the West of a Kremlin offer of "geaceful coexistence," involving concrete and substantial Kromlin concessions and an apparent revision of Kremlin policy?

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- D. What would be the effect upon each of the various Satellites and upon Soviet control of each of the Satellites of:
  - 1. Relaxation by the West of its present trade reservictions?
  - 2. Increased Western restrictions upon East-West trade?
- Co What effect would a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkey entents have upon the Balkan Satellites, individually and collectively? What effect would it have upon Kremlin policy?
- F. What would be the effect upon the Satellites, particularly East Germany, of the establishment of the EDC, including West German forces?
- Go What would be the effect upon the Satellites and upon

  Soviet control of the Satellites of a settlement of the

  German problem on either Soviet or Western terms?

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